Racial Capitalism and the National Question in the Early People’s Republic of China

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Recent diplomatic, economic, and military tensions between the United States and the People’s Republic of China have compelled quite a few scholars and observers to debate whether we are witnessing a new Cold War. The comparison often loses sight of the uneven quality of the Cold War and the ideological departures of reform-era China, but one commonality between the past and present is the spotlight on racial and ethnic conflict. The early PRC participated in a global critique of US imperialism and Jim Crow while Americans countered with their own evidence of abuses and dissent in the socialist world. Similarly, nationalists in each country now point to various forms of injustice in the other, whether it is white supremacy, xenophobia, racist violence, and systemic racism in the US, or the mass surveillance, detention, and assimilation of non-Han peoples in the PRC. In our present political conjuncture, how can China scholars productively bring together these transnational discussions of race and ethnicity in a way that troubles such instrumentalization that only reinforces geographical and conceptual divisions inherited from Cold War knowledge production?

Scholars of East Asia have long interrogated the origins of area studies in the postwar period, namely, how these interdisciplinary programs were meant to not only remedy the shortage of reliable information about non-European nations but also support American strategic interests during the Cold War. The
empirical premises of area studies were undermined when area specialists applied modernization theory to different societies and evaluated them according to an American ideal type that was far from realized domestically. During the Vietnam War, the Committee of Concerned Asia Scholars anticipated Edward Said's later critique of Orientalism and criticized the field's complicity with US foreign policy. They departed from earlier representations by reflecting on the history of imperialism and presenting radical political subjects. At the same time, student demands for greater inclusion and representation at US universities led to the formation of ethnic studies in the late 1960s.

Despite this shared moment of counterhegemonic protest, scholars have noted a deep-seated disciplinary divide between the study of geopolitics in area studies and that of race in ethnic studies that reflects foundational orientations to power, visible in both methodology and positionality. Critical race scholar David Theo Goldberg has pointed out how comparative accounts in area studies can be problematic for the study of race because the juxtaposition of discrete national examples can miss how race and racism are both "globally circulating, interacting, relational conditions" and "locally indexed, resonant, impacting." For literary critic Shu-mei Shih, scholars working in Asian Studies can appear to escape the realities of US racial politics by producing civilizational and culturalist scholarship, which recasts racialization as cultural difference and disavows the global connections constituting racial formation. In fact, area specialists can be quite dismissive of colleagues working in the vein of ethnic studies—an unease symptomatic of the premise of separation from one's object of study in area studies. Studies of Afro-Asian solidarity, Asian diasporas, and other trans-Pacific connections have worked to bridge these fields, but critical approaches to race remain limited in Asian Studies, especially when compared to the popularity of critical theory and postcolonial studies.

I build on these discussions focusing on divisions within the US academy by turning to the ways that certain conventions in the PRC can also foreclose considerations of race in the China field, even as it is home to a significant body of scholarship on nationalism and ethnicity. In The Intimacies of Four Continents, Asian American Studies scholar Lisa Lowe considers how liberal narratives of freedom were articulated within a context marked by settler colonialism, slavery, indenture, and empire and served to disavow their constitutive violence. For Lowe, reading across areas in the archive of liberalism can reveal imbricated processes and unspoken intimacies of colonized and dispossessed peoples. Chinese socialism articulated its own understandings of liberation, and its archive reveals categorical distinctions that can be productively brought together to illustrate the relations, tensions, and contradictions between different political projects. My discussion below considers how the archive of actually existing socialism separated race
(zhongzu) and nation/ethnicity (minzu) within a discursive field shaped not only by historical materialism but also by the geopolitical necessity to differentiate racialization in capitalist countries from ethnopolitics in socialist countries. This essay extends the insights of previous scholarship that has problematized the conceptual distinction between race and nation/ethnicity in other contexts by illustrating how its reification in China has functioned to externalize questions of racialization and the geography of racial capitalism.8

The discussion below first brings Cedric Robinson’s concept of racial capitalism to bear on existing scholarship that has attended to Chinese experiences and criticisms of the global color line. Next, I examine the trajectory of the terms “race” and “nation” after their moment of translation, particularly the ways in which leftist intellectuals differentiated them in response to right-wing conflations, often with reference to orthodox Marxist definitions of race as precapitalist. Lastly, I show how socialist intellectuals in the early PRC moved beyond orthodox understandings of race amidst solidarity forged with anti-racist and anti-colonial movements, but how the Cold War context also meant that their internationalist critiques of racial capitalism were separated from discussions of domestic ethnopolitics.

Racial Capitalism and Chinese Understandings of the Global Color Line

In Black Marxism, Cedric Robinson argued against conventional Marxist understandings of capitalism as a force of historical progress that negated feudalism and introduced the proletariat as the universal subject of history. Capitalism instead maintained premodern and early modern modes of violence and subjugation based on regional, cultural, and linguistic differences and further articulated them to include the categories of biological racism, reflecting its tendency to differentiate, not homogenize.9 Building on the Black radical tradition, Robinson’s concept of racial capitalism has inspired much scholarship on how the human, less-than-human, and nonhuman have been defined through capitalist world-making processes of settlement, slavery, imperialism, and migration.10 Scholars have long argued the analytic category of abstract labor can obscure racial divisions central to the production of surplus value.11 Recent attention to indigenous, racialized, and gendered forms of expropriation reveal the limits of analyses centered on the exploitation of the “free” waged worker by illustrating the often violent and coercive conditions necessary for the establishment of private property regimes, debt and extractive economies, labor-intensive industries, and social reproduction.12

Robinson’s concept of racial capitalism has been conspicuously absent in the China field, but existing scholarship would suggest that it is far from foreign to Chinese society and culture. Since the nineteenth century, political authorities
and intellectuals in China have been highly conscious of how the global color line structured the country’s standing vis-à-vis imperialist powers in the modern capitalist world. Early on, imperialist wars against China sought to demonstrate its racial inferiority and its need to cast off supposedly barbaric practices for its own universal principles, including free trade. Nineteenth-century liberal thinkers heralded the introduction of Chinese coolies to British and Spanish colonies as a transition from unfree to free labor, but despite the presence of contacts, conditions likened to slavery led some to argue that indentured workers were far from harbingers of freedom. In the Americas and Southeast Asia, anti-Chinese violence and exclusion also occurred through the identification of the “Asiatic racial form” with the seemingly abstract and destructive dimensions of capitalism, such as mercantile capital, mechanical efficiency, and less-than-human labor exempt from the needs of normative social reproduction. As a founding moment in the modern immigration system, Chinese exclusion allowed settlers to appropriate native identity and assimilate indigenous and racialized communities, all while spurring protests in China and compelling diasporic populations to return to an imagined homeland.

The late Qing translation of race and nation overlayed existing understandings of social difference in China (e.g., Han versus Manchu) and shaped understandings of a new capitalist world materializing in imperialist competition, war, colonization, concessions, and debt. The meaning of these neologisms remained fluid, and ambiguities shared with European discourses made them available for various projects across the political spectrum. When intellectuals embraced the modern concept of the nation (minzu), their search for an imagined community also identified a shared predicament (tongzhong, “same race/kind”) with other societies undergoing dispossession and the loss of sovereignty around the world. Alongside references to Red, Brown, and Jewish nations, the figure of the Black slave (Heinu) became a popular metaphor in modern Chinese literature for considering various forms of subjugation and possibilities for redemption. Even though race (renzhong/zhongzu) could be construed through historical configurations of power rather than phenotype or culture, many elites reproduced the logics, hierarchies, and exclusions of racialist thinking, even when they were accused of being provincial. Han nationalists defined the nation as a primordial community based in blood relations to first distinguish themselves from the Manchus and later claim common ancestry with non-Han peoples amidst debates over the nature and limits of the body politic. Some attempted to cross the global color line by claiming the superiority of the yellow race and possibilities for pan-Asianism or its proximity to whiteness and the need for intermarriage and racial amalgamation. By the 1930s, ethnologists rejected notions of consanguinity that led to the conflation of nation and race, differentiating them with reference to
culture and phenotype or arguing the latter was irrelevant because of racial mixing over the years.  

**Distinguishing Race and Nation as Anti-Fascism**

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) too distinguished the concepts of race and nation when organizing on different political fronts, which became articulated in relation to the perils of fascism. Communist internationalism and class-based organizing had long rejected liberal and fascist conceptualizations of race, but the Holocaust led socialist intellectuals to further disavow problematic theories that seemed commensurable with fascism. Biologist Zhou Jianren had introduced eugenic principles for racial improvement in the 1920s, but after the Second World War, he warned that the ruling class of capitalist countries deployed eugenics to serve as the basis for false claims of an innate lack of intelligence and morality among the oppressed, which supposedly led to criminality.  

Pseudoscientific abstractions about the inherited qualities of populations not only occluded the analyses of social conditions, but they also served as a justification for racism, class discrimination, war, and colonialism, with the Holocaust as its gravest example. Even though fascism had been defeated, Zhou argued it was important to remain vigilant, as its remnants could spread. He pointed to acts of violence being committed by GIs stationed in China after the war, and he argued that they were extensions of racism and injustice experienced by African Americans in the US.

Socialist intellectuals also distanced themselves from the Guomindang (GMD), who they deemed “fascist Han chauvinists,” a Chinese counterpart to Great Russian chauvinism. In the 1920s and 1930s, Marxist philosophers Li Da and Qu Qiubai introduced the national question using Soviet sources, but the implications of Stalin’s claims that the nation was a social formation particular to the capitalist epoch were unclear for semicolonial China, where intellectuals debated the periodization of feudalism and capitalism in Chinese history.  

When organizing in the hinterland, the CCP tried to win the support of non-Han peoples by recognizing a multiethnic polity, espousing the right to self-determination, incorporating ethnic oppression into social analysis, and banning ethnic slurs and insults. Its intellectuals lambasted the GMD for arguing that Han and non-Han peoples were the main and branch stocks of the same race and blood, differentiated only by religion and region. Marxist historian Lü Zhenyu argued that such arguments about racial stocks followed the wishful thinking of German and Japanese fascists. In contrast to GMD assimilationist accounts and lack of recognition, he also reminded readers how Han and non-Han peoples had been mutually constituted over time.

In the early PRC, some social scientists responded to the remnants of fascist ideology by reproducing an orthodox Marxist designation of race as a precapitalist
social formation, or situating it outside of history altogether. Historian Huang Yuanqi attributed the conflation between nation and race to the right-wing emphasis on blood relations and the lack of standardization in Soviet translations. He explained Chinese society comprised different races until the Warring States period, after which racial amalgamation occurred and clans emerged as the primary unit of social organization. The Qing conquest, the feudal system, and imperialism arrested national formation for Han and non-Han, but once the CCP liberated them from imperialists, bureaucratic capitalists, Han landlords, and non-Han elites, they had become a new democratic minzu. Sociologist Rong Guanxiong also criticized early PRC intellectuals for misuses of race, particularly in references to non-Han peoples that led to a barrage of new terms, such as “racial wars,” “racial contradictions,” “racial oppression,” and “racial struggles.” According to Rong, race was an effect of environmental factors on outward appearance that had no bearing on economic production, social development, or cultural formation—it was a biological phenomenon subject to anthropological research, not a social one like nation, which was subject to ethnological research. For these social scientists, race could not be a determining factor for historical analysis or a category for modern political organizing.

Internationalist Solidarity and Cold War Orientations

Earlier worlding practices combined with a global moment of decolonization, and a new socialist state served as the grounds for internationalist solidarity with anti-colonial and anti-racist struggles that moved discussions of race beyond orthodox positions. The official journal World Affairs (Shijie zhishi) became an important forum for critiques of racial capitalism, with coverage of apartheid in South Africa and Jim Crow in the US often presented to Chinese audiences as continuous with wartime fascism. Editor Chen Zanwei reported how under Prime Minister D. F. Malan, the passage of legislation, such as the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages, Group Areas Act, Suppression of Communism Act, and Pass Laws in South Africa subjected indigenous Africans, Indians, Malays, and Chinese to forced removal, separate settlements, political disenfranchisement, low-wage and dangerous work in mines, unhealthy environments, and counterinsurgency campaigns. By contrast, white South Africans held over 88 percent of land, and US investment in copper, magnesium, and uranium mines; motor vehicle and rubber production; and shipbuilding grew during and after the war. As Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong issued statements of solidarity, the journal publicized the work of anti-apartheid activists in organizing the general strike of June 26, 1950, and the historic Defiance Campaign of 1952.

Writing after the UN denunciation of racist policies in South Africa, scholar of international law Chen Tiqiang reminded readers in the lead-up to the Bandung
Conference that racism and colonialism were the common experience of African and Asian peoples. Racism facilitated the oppression of national minorities and colonized and semi-colonized nations, and it also facilitated labor exploitation and false consciousness that displaced class-based politics. The clearest example of racism was found in Aryanism and the genocide of six million Jews, the most shameful page in human history. In the postwar period, the racial divisions produced in apartheid South Africa were mirrored in European landholdings in Tunisia, the Gold Coast, and the Belgian Congo and the hyperexploitation of indigenous labor in Nigeria, Kenya, and French North Africa. For Chen, the center of racism was not Africa but the United States, where the ruling classes also manipulated the rule of law to perpetuate white supremacy (*bairen youyue lun*) and indoctrinate contempt for the colored races whose labor reaped great profits for American capitalists. Following the end of slavery, the police, the courts, and white supremacists colluded with one another to commit gross injustices against Black people, including political disenfranchisement, segregation, voter intimidation, and lynching. The conceits of so-called “American democracy” were only further challenged by racist violence and exclusion against Chinese and other Asian communities, later reproduced in Australia and New Zealand. The state of emergency in British Malaya also witnessed the deportation of Chinese and the establishment of fortified new villages for Chinese supporters of insurgents. From these examples meant to foster Afro-Asian solidarity, Chen Tiqiang concluded that racism could not be considered a domestic issue, particularly after the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its definition of crimes against humanity.

The PRC was very much in dialogue with the Black radical tradition that inspired Cedric Robinson’s concept of racial capitalism. W. E. B. Du Bois had long been invested in linking African and Asian liberation movements, from his early discussions of the global color line to later calls for African countries to build closer relations with China during the Cold War. For Black radicals such as Du Bois, China challenged a white and Western vision of class struggle, and its revolution represented an extension of their anti-capitalist and anti-racist politics on the world stage. Besides critical coverage of US policies and racist violence, the editors of *World Affairs* demonstrated solidarity by publishing firsthand accounts in translation. An op-ed written by a nineteen-year-old Black resident of Buffalo sought to dispel any illusions about northern states with a description of the dire poverty in her city and the need for socialism. A 1959 essay by James E. Jackson, southern director for the Communist Party, discussed the Black freedom struggle for economic opportunities, political rights, and social welfare as well as its intersections with worker, anti-imperialist, and communist organizing. A 1963 interview conducted with Robert and Mabel Williams in Beijing described their work with the NAACP, armed self-defense against white supremacists, and their exile to Cuba.
Official visits by W. E. B. and Shirley Graham Du Bois, William Worthy, Vicki Garvin, and Robert and Mabel Williams produced sympathetic accounts of the PRC for American audiences while also contributing to increased representations of Black agency in Chinese state media. Furthermore, representations of their visits, the student sit-ins in 1960, the Freedom Rides, desegregation in Little Rock and the University of Mississippi, the March on Washington, and the ongoing armed struggle in South Africa inspired some Chinese intellectuals to attend to race as a social question by revisiting Marx’s discussion of primitive accumulation in *Capital* and then extending its insights on expropriation to an era of US imperialism and monopoly capitalism. Social scientists Zhang Chunhan and Shi Zhemin challenged orthodox periodization by considering how the capitalist class inherited existing forms of racism, introduced new notions of physiological and mental differences, and popularized them on a global scale for the purposes of exploitation and colonization. They argued that US policies obscured the material effects of racism, including hyperexploitation (*ewai boxue*) through wage gaps, by not recognizing how racial oppression was animated by class struggle as identified by Williams. As Black activists and organizations took the media to be a site of anti-racist struggle and held race relations in the US up to global scrutiny during the Cold War, American policymakers began to turn to multiculturalism and to challenge white supremacist beliefs in the face of Southern elites that argued against racial integration precisely because of its socialist support.

At a time of geopolitical competition, the PRC pitted racial capitalism against its own vision of socialist ethnopolitics, with the effect that racism could only exist elsewhere. According to Chen Tiqiang and others, the Soviet Union and China had eliminated racial oppression domestically to become “a big loving and united family of different nationalities.” Like the Soviet Union, the CCP departed from its earlier position regarding self-determination following Japanese overtures to non-Han peoples and the establishment of puppet states during the Second World War. Nationality eventually became a category of territorial governance when the constitution promulgated the right to autonomy and self-government for non-Han peoples, ethnologists surveyed newly consolidated territory and designated official classifications for political representation, and CCP leaders pursued a United Front with local elites while training minority cadres drawn from the lower classes. While race could not be considered a domestic issue, nationality became one in China. Publications on the national question emphasized how the historical relationships between different tribes, tribal federations, and nations in China, including their contradictions and wars, were domestic in nature (*guonei xingzhi*). The CCP also maintained the separation of race and ethnicity by carefully orchestrating itineraries for foreign visitors that kept politically sensitive subjects out of sight, including the Tibetan uprising in 1959.
In spite of the political lines drawn between racial capitalism and socialist ethnopolitics, China scholars have documented problematic representations, assimilationist policies, and political violence targeting ethnic and religious minorities as “backward” and “feudal.” Political elites in the PRC did not completely abandon notions of blood lineage either, eventually drawing on them to articulate the idea that revolutionary credentials could be determined by personal background rather than political consciousness. At the same time, Mao-era solidarity with foreign entities was betrayed by nationalism, such as the 1962 border war with India, and developmentalist hierarchies, especially in relations with African countries. Not unlike the ways in which class-based politics subsumed the political subjects of woman and nation, state media also followed Mao's 1963 declaration that “the racial question is in essence a class question” and the universalist frame of world proletarian revolution flattened differences, including distinct experiences of expropriation.

**Conclusion**

This essay seeks to move beyond the comparativist methods and disciplinary divisions of the Cold War by reading across areas in the archive of Chinese socialism. I attend to the relational construction of race and nation in the early PRC though their historical conceptualization in relation to one another, global events and transnational connections that shaped their definitions, their mobilization for different emancipatory projects—namely, solidarity against racial capitalism and Han chauvinism—and contradictions that blurred political boundaries. Emptied of their former political content, the disarticulated concepts of race and ethnicity have often been reduced to foreign and domestic modes of social differentiation in the reform era, which can allow nationalists to claim that there is no racism in their country and can allow China scholars to deny the relevance of race to the field. Yet, the externalization of race and racism is particularly dubious these days as China’s participation in global capitalism has been accompanied by prominent examples of Islamophobia and anti-Blackness. Not only has the Chinese state taken cues from the US, Israel, and Europe for its rhetoric of terrorism and programs of counterinsurgency. Policy advisors have also proposed casting off socialist understandings of ethnicity tied to territory for a depoliticized model of American multiculturalism, which has been criticized for enabling neoliberal restructuring and governance, introducing new forms of privilege and stigma, and obscuring ongoing dispossession. While some scholars and observers have looked to the imperial past for understanding present-day geopolitics, transhistorical gestures to a Chinese world order can miss capitalism’s history of exploiting various axes of difference, including race, to produce surplus value as well as the anti-racist and socialist worldmaking projects of its critics. This essay suggests it may be useful to
instead consider China's evolving relationship to racial capitalism, including the legacies and limitations of earlier critiques.

**Notes**


10 Here, I am drawing from Weheliye’s concept of “racializing assemblages” that discipline humanity into full humans, non-quite-humans, and nonhumans in Weheliye, *Habeas Viscus*.


100 : WHO IS THE ASIANIST?


33 Chen Tiqiang, “Ya Fei renmin fandui zhongzu zhuyi,” *Shijie zhishi* no. 8 (1955), 14–16.


**Bibliography**


